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OVERCOMING PROPERTY: DOES 
COPYRIGHT TRUMP PRIVACY? 
Julie E. Cohen' 
Online copyright enforcement represents one of the greatest 
current threats to online privacy. As a byproduct of the asserted 
imperative to control flows of unauthorized information, copyright 
owners and their technology partners are building into digital rights 
management ("DRM") systems a range of capabilities that implicate the 
privacy interests of users. These include both the ability to collect 
extraordinarily fine-grained information about uses of DRM-protected 
contene and the ability to reach into users' homes and restrict what they 
can do with copies of works for which they have paid.2 Copyright owners 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Internet: jec@law.georgetown.edu. I 
thank Clarissa Potter for her helpful suggestions and Andrew Crouse for his excellent research 
assistance. 
@ 2003, Julie E. Cohen. Copies of this article may be made and distributed for educational use, 
provided that: (i) copies are distributed at or below cost; (ii) the author and the University of Illinois 
Journal of Law, Technology & Policy are identified; and (iii) proper notice of copyright is affixed. 
1. An example of a DRM surveillance system is the one designed by RealNetworks, a 
manufacturer of software for streaming music and video files. The software collected and reported 
information about the system on which it was installed, including the number and titles of music files 
stored on the system and the types of portable music player installed. Oass actions filed in California, 
Illinois, and Pennsylvania by users who discovered their RealNetworks software "phoning home" have 
charged that this conduct violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and violated state law 
privacy rights. Greg Miller, RealNetworks Breached Privacy, 3 Suits Contend, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
1999, at Cl. The suits have been consolidated into a single proceeding, pending in the Northern 
District of Illinois. Amid the storm of protest that followed announcement of the lawsuits, 
RealNetworks rushed to disable its remote data collection capabilities, but maintains that it broke no 
laws. Id. 
2. Within the past year or so, members of the recording industry have test-marketed several 
new releases in CD-based formats designed to prevent copying. In some cases, these copy-protection 
formats also prevent playback using a personal computer. The new CD copy-protection schemes have 
been the subject of several lawsuits, but so far no court has considered whether their implementation 
violates any law. The first lawsuit, filed by a California resident against Music City Records, 
Fahrenheit Entertainment, and DRM provider Suncomm, resulted in an out-of-court settlement. The 
defendants agreed to provide clearer disclosures about functionality restrictions and compatibility 
requirements; any other terms are undisclosed. Amy Harmon, CD-Protection Complaint is Settled, 
N.Y. DMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at CS. The other, Dickey v. Universal Music Group, is a class action 
brought on behalf of affected consumers by a noted class action firm, and may be less likely to settle at 
an early stage. Brenda Sandburg, Milberg Weiss Files Suit Over CDs With No-Copy Technology, THE 
RECORDER, June 17,2002, at 1; P.J. Huffstutter & Jon Healey, Suit Filed Against Record Firms, L.A. 
TIMES, June 14,2002, at C3. 
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also have exerted political and legal pressure on third-party providers of 
technologies and services to build similar capabilities into their own 
systems,3 and on network service providers to monitor and report on the 
activities of their customers.4 Efforts are underway to design DRM 
capabilities into the dominant operating system for personal computers 
and into microprocessors.5 
For the most part, the privacy implications of DRM systems go 
unexamined in the mainstream legislative and policy debates about the 
proper scope of a copyright owner's rights. Instead, courts and some 
commentators (and many intellectual property lawyers) have 
characterized the design of DRM systems as grounded, 
unproblematically, in principles of copyright and contract law and 
justified by reference to a copyright owner's need to enforce its property 
rights. Yet it is far from obvious why this should be so. The shift to 
privacy-invasive modes of copyright protection does not concern only the 
enforcement of formal copyright entitlements, nor even simple 
enforcement of bargains made in the shadow of the copyright law. Many 
of the user behaviors over which control is sought traditionally have been 
considered beyond law's reach. May private control extend to these 
behaviors? If so, on what basis? 
This essay does not attempt to specify the privacy ri~hts that users 
might assert against the purveyors of DRM systems. Instead, it 
undertakes a very preliminary, incomplete exploration of several 
questions on the "property" side of this debate. What is the relationship 
between rights in copyrighted works and rights in things or collections of 
bits embodying works? In particular, as the (popular and legal) 
3. In several recent high-profile disputes, members of the copyright industry have sought to 
compel unwilling third-party providers to conduct surveillance for them. In a contributory copyright 
infringement suit against SonicBlue, the maker of the ReplayTV video recording device, the copyright 
industry plaintiffs requested a discovery order directing the defendant to rewrite the ReplayTV 
software to generate information detailing subscribers' use of the device. The order was denied on 
procedural grounds. Farhad Manjoo, SonicBlue Freed From Monitoring, WIRED, June 3, 2002, 
available at http://www.wired.com/newslbusiness/0.1367.52934.00.html; Jon Healey, Liberties Group 
Sues Studios Over Consumers' Use of Digital Devices, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2002, § 3 (Business), at 2. 
Whether SonicBlue is liable for contributory copyright infringement, and whether monitoring of user 
behavior might be required as part of a remedial order, are questions that remain unresolved. 
4. A federal district judge recently ruled that the recording industry could invoke statutory 
subpoena provisions directed toward providers of Web hosting services to compel Internet access 
provider Verizon to identify a subscriber alleged to have traded infringing MP3 files over a peer-to-
peer network. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2003). The recording 
industry also has sent letters to the presidents of U.S. colleges and universities requesting that they 
begin monitoring student accounts to detect peer-to-peer file trading activities, see American Council 
on Education, Higher Education Associations and the Creative Content Community Letters on P2P 
Piracy, ACEnet Eye on Washington, (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://www.acenet.edul 
washingtoniletters/2002/10october/copyright.cfm (last visited May 7, 2003). 
5. See Neil McIntosh, Online: Old Bill's Police Tactics, THE GUARDIAN, July 4, 2002; Chris 
Gaither, Intel Chip to Include Antipiracy Features, Some Still Fear Privacy of Users Will Be Violated, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10,2002, at O. 
6. I attempt that task elsewhere. See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2003). 
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understanding of copies of works as residing in "things" becomes largely 
metaphorical, how should the law construct and enforce boundedness 
with respect to those copies? Does the calculus of property and contract 
allow for consideration of other rights, based neither in works nor in 
things, that might be weighed in the balance? I will suggest that the 
property justification for using DRM systems to invade privacy is far too 
narrow, and ignores a number of important public policy considerations. 
An attempt to parse the interaction between copyright and privacy 
might begin by disentangling the legal attributes of copyrighted works 
from those of the things in which copies of works are embodied or 
stored. Do individual users of copyrighted works have rights in 
things/copies that limit or trump copyright rights? Do copyright owners, 
the antecedent owners or licensors of the things/copies in question, have 
rights in things/copies that augment their copyright rights? If both users 
and owners have rights in things/copies, how do those rights interact? 
This process of disaggregation proves both harder and less conclusive 
than might be supposed, and it exposes the underlying problems as 
fundamentally problems of policy. 
Copyright law gives copyright owners rights in works, not things. 
Even so, it is not quite correct to say that, therefore, copyright law gives 
copyright owners no rights in the things embodying their works. 
Copyright subsists, at least in part, in the form of rights to prevent others 
from taking certain actions with things embodying copies of the work, for 
example, reproducing and selling copies, causing copies to be displayed 
publicly to viewers not present at the place where the copy is located, 
and so on.7 In other words, copyright law gives copyright owners (some) 
rights in things as proxies for rights in works. 
The distinction between rights in works and rights in things also 
means, however, that copyright owners' rights in things embodying 
works are limited in two important ways. First, copyright law gives users 
of copyrighted works certain statutorily defined freedoms with respect to 
things/copies as well. Of these, the two most closely linked to user 
privacy are the first sale doctrine, which recognizes a right of alienation 
that includes the freedom to lend one's copy of a work, and the fair use 
doctrine, which sanctions certain acts of private copying.s Second, and 
less well appreciated, copyright law implicitly reserves to users the right 
to engage in conduct not encompassed by the statute.9 The inaptly-
named fair use doctrine may tend to suggest that if some uses of 
copyrighted works are fair, then all other uses must be unfair, but that is 
a long way from the truth. Fair use and other copyright limitations are 
not outer limits on permissible uses of copyrighted works and the things 
7. See 17 U.S.c. § 106 (2000). 
8. See 17 U.S.c. §§ 107, 109(a) (2000). 
9. See 17 U.S.c. § 106 (2000) (enumerating the exclusive rights of copyright owners); Jessica 
Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.l. 29,40-43 (1994). 
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embodying them. They are simply outer limits on a copyright owner's 
statutory rights. It follows that any uses not covered by one of those 
rights, such as reading a book that one owns, are reserved to users 
whether or not the fair use doctrine applies. If there are broader limits 
on individual users' freedom to make use of things embodying works, 
they must arise from another source. 
Copyright law does not end the inquiry, however, because copyright 
owners also claim rights in the things embodying their works as things, 
that is, regardless of the fact that copyrighted content is involved. This is 
the second prong of copyright owners' "property" argument: things 
embodying works are their personal property. They may choose to sell 
these things, or to structure transactions granting access to them in some 
other way. The greater power to withhold the transaction entirely 
includes the lesser power to impose conditions on the terms of access and 
use. If the result is that individual users are left with fewer freedoms 
than copyright law appeared to contemplate, the conventional answer is 
that individuals exercise their autonomy rights by choosing to enter into 
the license transactions. 
This argument about the consequences of property rights in things 
is consistent with the thesis advanced by Michael Heller that viewing 
property as a bundle of fragmentary entitlements leads inexorably to the 
expansion of property rights. lo This insight underscores a profound 
irony: the legal realist mantras that property rights are relational, and 
that the life of the law is also the sum of bargains made in its shadow, can 
as easily be used to strengthen property entitlements as to limit them. ll 
Heller's thesis, however, does not seem sufficient by itself to capture 
fully the expansionist dynamic that plays out in the copyright 
marketplace. The expansion is particularly dramatic in the case of things 
embodying works, and not just because the bundle of rights conferred by 
copyright is particularly limited to start with. Conditions imposed on 
would-be users of things embodying copyrighted works far outstrip any 
conditions imposed on would-be users of other kinds of things. 
The variety of conceivable and purportedly legitimate restrictions 
on user behavior appears limitless. In April 2002, I participated in a 
panel discussion on copyright law sponsored, for CLE credit, by the 
intellectual property law section of a prominent local bar association. 
One of the cases discussed was Kelly v. Arriba SOjt,12 in which the Ninth 
10. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.l. 1163, 1191·94 (1999). 
11. Cf Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY, NOMOS XXII 69, 76 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
[A]ll of these developments - the new economic structures, the legal forms through which they 
are organized, and the theooretical [sic] analysis of property that they suggest - can be plausibly 
seen as entirely internal to the capitalist market system ... [and] in no way fueled by the ethics, 
politics, or interests of socialism, collectivism, paternalism, or redistributive egalitarianism. 
/d. 
12. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Circuit held that a visual search engine's reproduction of "thumbnail" 
images from catalogued sites was fair use, but that its framing of full-
sized images from those sites infringed the copyright owner's public 
display rights. I compared the search engine to a tour guide, and asked 
whether a copyright owner could invoke its public display rights to 
prevent a real-space tour guide from conducting visitors through a 
gallery show from back to front. I was informed by audience members, 
in no uncertain terms, that a copyright owner could invoke its "property" 
right in the works to do just that. I enquired whether the copyright 
owner could similarly invoke its "property" right in the works to require 
viewers to walk through the gallery in shackles. It wasn't even a close 
call. They triumphantly assured me that, of course, it could. 
At the core of this "property" argument is a sort of control-
fetishism. Precisely because copyright does not subsist in things, the 
things in which copies of works are embodied take on near-iconic 
significance. Rights in the work and rights in the thing merge to 
constitute a sort of aber-copyright, a property right delineated as 
absolute sovereignty over the disposition and use of both "work" 
attributes and thing attributes. It is noteworthy that in describing this 
right, copyright owners and their advocates have reverted to the 
language of natural rights. This is also the language of pre-1976 common 
law copyright, of the sort that sometimes protected unpublished 
manuscripts against unauthorized publication. Rights in the work and 
rights in the thing become conflated, and strict controls are imposed 
upon access to and use of the thing to guard against perceived 
vulnerability of rights in the work. 13 This usage of "license" is oddly 
consistent with the term's core definition as a limited grant of permission 
from the sovereign to engage in particular conduct - e.g., hunting deer in 
the royal forest, or driving a car on the state's roads. This meaning 
depends fundamentally on the notion of the power to exclude as not 
merely greater, but absolute. 14 
At this point, we have pretty well lost sight of the fact that copyright 
does not grant "sovereignty", not over works, nor over things, nor over 
individual users themselves. The "licenses" that dictate the conditions of 
access and use also set the boundaries of user freedom. Well, a diehard 
copyright enforcer might reply, so what? Is there anything wrong with 
that? 
13. For a more measured academic defense of this position, see Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having 
Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. 
INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 345 (Hugh Hansen ed., forthcoming 2003). 
14. At bottom, this understanding of property is premised on the Blackstonian ideal of "sole and 
despotic dominion ... over the external things of the world." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2. The point that broadly defined property 
entitlements can confer equally despotic dominion over persons is not new. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, 
Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 762 (1986); 
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL. L.Q. 8 (1927); Joseph William Singer, Legal 
Theory: Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. u.L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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First of all, the argument from license, or more conscientiously from 
informed consent, ignores that individuals have property rights in things 
as well, including both the personal computers that are used to access 
copyrighted works and the homes and apartments from which access is 
gained. The "licenses" that set the boundaries of consumer freedom to 
use works also set the boundaries of consumer freedom to use both 
property and concomitant seclusion that is theirs beyond dispute. 
The argument that individuals who wish to use DRM-protected 
information goods must accept the accompanying invasions of their own 
property is premised on a massive double standard. Information users 
have to accept incursions into their own environment, but information 
proprietors do not. Where information providers are concerned, user 
activities much less invasive than the incursions worked by DRM 
technologies are legally actionable. Thus, for example, the use of spiders 
or bots to crawl the Web and gather comparative pricing information 
may be enjoined as a trespass to chattels upon the mere speculation that 
the information-gathering might under certain circumstances strain the 
technical capacities of the system.15 According to two courts, the process 
of comparison shopping via automated software agents also violates the 
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CF AA"), which prohibits 
unauthorized access to a computer involved in interstate commerce or 
communication, i.e., any computer linked to the Internet.16 At the same 
time, we are told that the use of advanced Web marketing techniques to 
deposit "cookies" on users' computers constitutes neither trespass 
(because it is purportedly consensual) nor unauthorized access 
prohibited by the CFAA.17 On the legislative front, copyright owners 
urge Congress to create an exemption from the CF AA allowing them to 
send users of peer-to-peer networks logic bombs disguised as copies of 
their copyrighted works.18 
From the perspective of a property formalist, these results are 
decidedly peculiar. The answer cannot be that copies of works are 
bounded property but individuals' home computers are not. A server 
connected to the Internet, and files residing on that server, are much less 
bounded than a home computer system that cannot directly serve up 
content. In the case of the CF AA, the rule allowing some acts of 
unauthorized access but forbidding others has partly to do with the 
15. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 
Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). For critical analysis of this 
reasoning, see Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 1. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000); 
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate 
Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.l. 561 (2001). 
16. 18 U.S.c. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (e)(2)(B) (2000); see EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 
274 F.3d 577, 582-85 (1st Cir. 2001); Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52. 
17. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 14-15 (D. Mass. 2002); Chance v. 
Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1158-60 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleOick, Inc. Privacy 
Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
18. See H.R. 5211, 107th Congo (2d Sess. 2002). 
HeinOnline -- 2002 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 381 2002
No.2] DOES COPYRIGHT TRUMP PRIVACY? 381 
statutory minimum damares requirement. A plaintiff must show 
damages exceeding $5,000;1 according to the courts, Web crawling causes 
this much damage, but cookies do not. Even this conclusion, though, is 
not as straightforward as it seems. In one of the Web crawling cases, the 
plaintiff met the statutory damages requirement not by showing that the 
defendant's information-gathering itself had caused harm - it had not -
but by showing that it had spent more than the statutory minimum on 
technical consultants hired to assess whether damage had occurred.20 In 
the other, the court granted relief based on speculation about the harm 
that mi§ht occur if the plaintiff's server became overloaded and 
crashed. 1 The plaintiffs in the cookie cases, meanwhile, were denied the 
benefit of similar speculation about the harms they claimed to have 
suffered.22 
The debate about what constitutes proper versus improper access to 
another's computer system turns not on the formality of boundedness, 
but rather on policy choices that determine where boundaries will be 
drawn and enforced. The switch from metaspace to cyberspace masks 
the slipperiness of these choices. We believe that (some kinds of) rights 
reside in things and inhere within boundaries, yet in digital space the 
notion of "thing-ness" is at least partially fictitious. We are, after all, 
attempting to define and delimit rights that inhere in transient 
agglomerations of bits and to reconcile conceptions of boundedness 
based on the physical world with the fact of open networking 
communications protocols.23 In fact, the legal regime being created in 
digital space is not "simply" a regime based on property rights designed 
to mimic the behavior of property rights in real space. Instead, we are 
constructing a legal regime in which notions of boundedness are applied 
unevenly and unequally. In a legal culture that believes in taking 
property seriously, resolving the tension between owners' and users' 
rights in things requires consideration of users' countervailing rights in 
some less expedient manner than simply defining them away. 
All of this property talk also dances around the question of whether 
consumers have (or should have) other affirmative rights to prevent such 
conduct. In a narrow doctrinal sense, the distinction between property 
and privacy is the historical one between contract and tort - between a 
libertarian conception of obligation voluntarily assumed and broader 
notions of public policy. In a more abstract sense, the distinction is 
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(4) (2000). 
20. See EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 585. Congress subsequently amended the CFAA to 
sanction the treatment of damage assessment costs as damages. 18 U.S.c. § 1030(e)(1l) (2002). 
21. See Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52. 
22. See cases cited supra note 17. 
23. See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 
91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (critiquing transplantation of "place" metaphors to cyberspace to 
support the definition and enforcement of property rights "there"); Mark A. Lemley, Place and 
Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (same). 
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between forms of marketplace conduct viewed as substantively 
acceptable if procedurally fair and other forms of conduct viewed as 
invidious because they violate societal aspirations to protect values not 
readily comprehended by markets. 
Even in the privacy arena, though, the myth of property as 
sovereignty is omnipresent. Advocates of market ordering criticize 
privacy as conceptually flaccid, lacking in definitional clarity (and, in 
particular, lacking the crispness that "property" connotes). Yet no one 
insists that "property" be susceptible of a comparably unitary definition, 
and, indeed, the prevailing view of property as a fragmentary bundle of 
entitlements suggests quite forcefully that one could not so insist.24 If 
notions of "property" are evolving and contested in digital spaces, the 
insistence on a fixed, coherent definition of "privacy" is even more 
perplexing; under the circumstances, it is equally hard to see why 
definitions of "privacy" should remain static. Yet, the double standard 
persists even under conditions of change. No one asks what "reasonable 
expectations of property" might be or tries to suggest that property 
entitlements should diminish in scope and force as invading them 
becomes easier; indeed, quite the opposite is true. In contrast, the 
prevailing approach to defining privacy entitlements takes reasonable 
expectation as its lodestar and assumes erosion to be the natural state of 
ff ' 25 a airs. 
Rather than engage the question why we value property so highly 
and privacy so little, the conventional wisdom about consumer privacy 
seeks refuge, once again, in the notion of license and its corollaries, 
informed consent and waiver. Weare told that informed consumers can 
waive their privacy rights, just as they can waive their copyright 
privileges, and that the option not to transact at all preserves choice. The 
harshness of this rule may be mitigated to a degree by sweeping 
information access issues under the ae~is of consumer protection law, as 
some commentators have suggested.2 But prevailing conceptions of 
consumer protection laws are largely proceduralist and proceed on the 
assumption that an informed consumer is an adequately protected one. 
The suggestion that the law can rely upon a single act of waiver to 
slice through the Gordian knot of copyrights, other personal property 
and place rights, and privacy rights has a certain seductiveness. Like 
24. See Grey, supra note 11. 
25. It is worth noting that when courts are confronted, instead, with the oxymoronic assertion of 
corporate privacy in trade secrets, the standard of protection instantly becomes less evanescent; trade 
secrets are protected if their owner has made reasonable efforts to ensure their security. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g (1985); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 1(4)(ii) (1985); see also Andrew Riggs Dunlap, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade Secret Law: 
A Response to Kyllo v. United States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2195 (2002) (recommending adoption of the 
"reasonable efforts" standard in Fourth Amendment privacy cases). 
26. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Digital Rights Management {and, or, vs.} the Law, 46 COMM. 
ACM (forthcoming 2003). 
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beads on a string, rights in works, rights in things, and non-property 
rights click neatly into their allotted places, and we need not confront the 
difficult problem of how to weigh competing claims directly against one 
another. Intellectual property practitioners, in particular, need not 
confront the difficult ethical questions attending an expansive view of 
copyright as sovereignty. 
But it is deeply disingenuous to pretend that the conflict between 
copyright and user privacy is amenable to resolution by zero-sum 
doctrinal calculus. The problem that courts and policymakers must 
resolve is fundamentally a problem of power and its limits - power to 
impose the terms of "licenses," power to define the boundaries of things, 
and power to specify the extent of the privacy that users should 
reasonably be entitled to expect. To a substantial degree, the answers 
that we devise will shape the degree of privacy that information users -
which is to say everyone, will enjoy in the era of digitally transmitted 
information. 
HeinOnline -- 2002 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 384 2002
